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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - UNIFORM
LAWS. In Breckenridge, et al. v. City of Watertown, 237 N.W. 139,
the plaintiffs were owners of agricultural lands lying within the City
of Watertown and they sought to have their land detached from the
City of Watertown and annexed to the Town of Watertown as pro-
vided for in Stat. 62.075. Upon the verdict being for the plaintiffs the
City of Watertown appealed.
The language of the statute in question, namely, "When land used
for agricultural purposes of an area of 200 acres or more * * * shall
have been within the corporate limits of such city (of the fourth class)
for twenty years or more * * * ," shows on its face that it is special
legislation. The statute arbitrarily selects a class and gives certain
members of that class a right which is denied to all other members
of that class. The state Supreme Court rightly declared this legislation
to be unconstitutional in that Article 1, Section 1 and 22 of the Wis-
consin Constitution condemn laws which grant privileges to a favored
class.
With due deference to the Supreme Court, the reviewer desires to
raise a point which the Supreme Court did not mention, namely, that
this legislation is unconstitutional because it is contrary to Article 4,
Section 31, Subsection 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibits
the legislature "from enacting any special or private laws * * * for in-
corporating any city, town, or village or amending the charter thereof."
It is evident that Stat. 62.075 is an attempted amendment of the char-
ters of the cities of the fourth class. The language of the statute is con-
sistently in the past tense, and "where the language used is plain the
court can not read words into it which are not found therein either
expressly or by fair implication even to save its constitutionality,
because this would be legislation and not construction." Mellen Lum-
ber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 114: Rogers-Ruger Co. v.
Murray, 115 Wis. 267.
One then is justified in saying that the legislature enacted a statute
for a closed class. By the very wording of the statute there is not suffi-
cient elasticity to have it apply to cities of the fourth class which might
come into existence in the future. "That is not classification which
merely designates one county in the commonwealth and makes no
provision by which any other county may, by reason of its increase of
population in the future, come within the class." Commonwealth v.
Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258. On August 3, 1929 when this statute was pub-
lished and took effect one could ascertain with certainty what cities
were in the fourth class. "The effect of the act would have been pre-
cisely the same if the city had been designated by name instead of the
CASE NOTES
circumlocution employed." State, ex rel. v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592.
The Wisconsin Constitution, in common with many other states, in
Article 4, Section 32, declares that general laws must be enacted, and
that they shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state. "A
statute would not be constitutional * * * which should select particular
individuals for a class or locality and subject them to peculiar rules,
or impose upon them special obligations or burdens from which others
in the same class or locality are exempt. * * * Every one has a right
to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute
which, without his consent, singles his case out as one to be regulated
by a different law from that which is applied in all similar cases would
not be legitimate legislation, but would be such an arbitrary mandate
as is not within the province of free government." Cooley Constitu-
tional Limitations, 391.
In Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, at 390-2 the court
list8 certain well established rules by which the propriety of the classifi-
cation may be tested. "One rule is: All classification must be based
upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from
another * * * . Another rule is: The classification adopted must be
germane to the purpose of the law * * * . Another rule is: The classi-
fication must not be based upon existing circumstances only * * *
Another rule is: To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply to
each member thereof * * * ." Adams v. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363: State,
ex rel. Risch v. Trustees, 121 Wis. 44; State, ex rel. Morgan v. Dorn-
brook, 188 Wis. 426. In applying these rules to the instant case, one
cannot help but come to the conclusion that the statute in question was
special legislation. The constitutional provisions (Art. 4, Sec. 31, 32)
are certainly free from ambiguity. The language is plain, simple, direct
and commanding. It expressly prohibits the legislature from enacting
any special laws for the amendment of charters of cities. Since the
legislature attempted to do this very thing in Section 62.075, the statute
is of necessity unconstitutional.
CHARLES A. RIEDL.
CRIMINAL LAW-JURISDICTION-INDIANS. State v. Rufus, (Wis.)
237 N.W. 67. Fifty years ago, in a prosecution by the state of an
Indian for adultery committed on an Indian reservation, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court decided that the state courts had jurisdiction of
violations by Indians of state criminal statutes. State v. Doxtater, 47
Wis. 278. In this case the court recognized only two possible limitations
which might be imposed on such jurisdiction: existing treaties with
the Indians, and acts admitting the state into the union. It was held,
